This paper using cross-sectional data on 39 Sub-Saharan African countries examines how political and economic governance affect the most recent data on poverty for the period of 2000 -2007. For this period, the paper finds that the average percentages of population living on less than $1.25 a day and on less than $2.00 a day are 50 and 70, respectively in Sub-Saharan Africa. It finds that these percentages can be reduced by a half in 12.5 years and 28 years, respectively if the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grows sustainably at 5% per annum. Whereas, at a real per capita GDP growth rate of 7% per annum, the percentages can be reduced by half in 9 and 20 years, respectively. Government expenditures are found irrelevant to the poverty reduction. Similarly, high literacy rates are not found to trickle down to any significant poverty reductions. The political governance variables used in the paper are all found not to contribute towards poverty reductions. The paper confirms strongly that real per capita GDP is what matters most to poverty reductions in Sub-Saharan Africa.
INTRODUCTION
Poverty is a condition of deprivation, where one cannot meet the economic and social standards of well being. There are multiple causes of poverty, which can all be classified to be emanating from three sources, which are personal failures, structural failures or man-made failures. Poverty can be caused by personal characteristics, such as laziness, and lack of initiatives; that is, it is caused by some inherent personal traits that a person can be borne with or learned from the environment.
Poverty can be caused by structural failures such as failure of the economic and political structures of the society, in which a person finds himself or herself in. This structural failure is the governance failure of the society. Governance failure is the failure of the people to acquire power and authority to influence and make policies and decisions regarding their public life, economic and social Abbreviations: GDP, Gross domestic product; PRSPs, poverty reduction strategy papers; IMF, international monetary fund; OLS, ordinary least squares. development (Bonfiglioli, 2003) . Man-made causes of poverty, such as some members of the society preda-ting on others, or bad cultural practices, can be referred to as governance failures. Poverty can fundamentally be a result of governance failure in terms of insufficient policies and ill-designed developmental programmes, like those hampering access to social services, control over productive assets and political empowerment (Bonfiglioli, 2003) . When the government fails to protect property rights, enforce rule of law, implement anti-corruption policies and achieve government accountability, poverty becomes pervasive and uncontrollable.
This situation of poverty is what the current paper believes characterizes the poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. It models poverty as a function of governance, and defines governance to be presented by both political and economic governance. The political governance is proxy by government expenditure, instability and presidential longevity variables, whereas economic governance is represented by literacy and economic growth variables. This paper estimates the cross section data for the Sub-Saharan Africa. Then, questions how our governance variables (both political and economic variables) affect poverty and whether observed differences in poverty can be attributed to the selected governance variables which are also investigated and analyzed.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Good governance is imperative to poverty reduction, when governments fail to function properly, resources are wasted and people are denied social legal and economic protection (Grindle, 2002) . Good governance should be characterized by the presence of political checks and balances without fear or intimidation. Grindle (2002) finds that most poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), in Africa fails to provide these political checks and balances and to link governance to poverty reduction. Moore et al. (1999) uses the composite index of quality government produced for the international investors and lenders and the degree of government dependence on its people for resources to be governance variables to explain changes in human development. He finds negative relationship between the composite index and the human development, and finds that governments that are critically dependent on its people for resources contribute more to human development than those that are less dependent. These variables for governance can be challenged; the composite index does not reflect the view of the poor people and that of the other citizens of the country. Human development is low in Africa, and because of pervasive poverty, governments are less dependent on its citizens for resources; thus, his conclusion may not be consistent under a different setting. Due to this definitional variation of governance, Khan (2009) also finds no evidence that good governance significantly reduces poverty. In today's globalized world, where exchange market economy dominates, poverty can be reduced to income poverty. A person is poor in an exchange economy if his or her income fails to afford him or her economic and social standards of well being. These standards of well beings are available in the exchange economy; the person can only afford them with certain levels of income. He or she will fail to attain this level of income when his economy is not growing, he has no required education, his government expenditures are not pro-poor, he lives in a politically instable society, where he cannot plan ahead, save and acquire wealth, or he lives with a boring and overstaying president that renders him hopeless and uncreative. Poor people have little influence to assess the performance of their leaders and hold them accountable when they are in power. Thus, the time to leave power and then face the accountability must be known with certainty in poor countries. This essential component is missing in PRSPs and many other poverty reduction studies. The current paper incorporates presidential longevity as an essential component for poverty reduction. The other variables are Sillah 757 political instability, government expenditure, education and economic growth. Political instability causes and perpetuates poverty. This conclusion has been reached in the findings of many researchers, such as Alesina et al. (1996) , Sonmez (1998) , Kyimali-Brempong and Traynor (1999) , Sandy (2000) and Narayan et al. (2007) . Political instability scares away the investors and tourists (Sonmez, 1998) . Corruption and public fund expropriation are high in politically instable societies where leaders expect to bear fewer future costs of their expropriatory actions (Knack, 2003) . Other researchers argue that it is the other way around. It is the poverty that invites political instability (Londregan et al., 1990; McGowan, 2003; Hicky, 2005) . Poverty is found to be a common denominator (Londregan et al., 1990) . Hicky (2005) in fact observes that politics may not benefit the poor since political discourse is often biased towards the economically active few in the society. Political instability will not leave out the poor; the poor will be often the first to be engulfed, their vulnerability will be aggravated and poverty worsened, because when the political elites fight, the poor suffers the most. The poor can suffer under stable political societies when the government expenditures fail to be pro-poor. Rank et al. (2003) argue that government expenditure must provide some minimum social safety nets to prevent structural causes of poverty. They show that without government interventions, people living below poverty line in developed countries would be as high as 39% of their population. Thus, if government interventions in SubSaharan Africa can provide what their counterparts are doing in the developed countries, there would be almost no poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other factors that can also affect poverty reduction are education and economic growth.
Appleton (2001), Bigsten (2003) , Fan et al. (2004 ), Jung (2003 , and Tarabini (2010) have all shown that education is an important determinant of poverty reduction. In studying Chinese rural families, Wu et al. (2008) show that families with the same economic endowments but different educational endowments take different growth routes. In analyzing education, income and poverty in 1990s in Uganda, Appleton (2001) shows that growth in living standards and poverty reduction was fastest for more educated households than others. Sometimes, education may fail to explain variations in poverty because of the bidirectional effects. Poverty, on the other hand, diminishes the poor's access to education (Bonal, 2007) , or because mass education, rather than quality education has little to do with poverty reduction (Wedgwood, 2007) . The impact of economic growth, per se, on poverty reduction has also been disputed. Dollar and Kraay (2004) have argued that increase in growth rates translate on average into proportionate increases in incomes of the poor. Though their position has been attacked by Luebker et al. (2002) on the basis that their theoretical base and data are flawed and that their policy variables are not appropriately defined, more research findings have come out to support the evidence of Dollar and Kraay (2004) . Moser and Ichida (2001) , Adams (2003) , Quentin (2007) , and have all found that economic growth reduces poverty. Recent findings by Akoum (2008) and Donaldson (2008) still doubt the causation.
Akoum (2008) observes that countries registering high growth rates do not necessarily succeed in reducing poverty; and there are still cases when growth does not affect poverty (Donaldson, 2008) . The current paper is to contribute to this debate and inquiry. It assumes poverty to be a function of government expenditure, political instability, presidential longevity, education and economic growth.
The paper is expected to argue that constitutional presidential term makes good governance that eventually brings about fresh ideas and make leaders more responsibly pro-poor. As it adds this new variable into the poverty reduction inquiry, it uses the literacy rate of the population to investigate whether the acclaimed high registered literacy rates of many Sub-Saharan Africa countries are trickling down to poverty reduction and whether the government expenditures are pro-poor? These questions and the question whether differences in poverty levels can be attributed to differences in our selected governance variables and economic and educational variables are the focus of investigation, analysis and contribution of the current paper.
MODEL AND DATA
Today, poverty in Africa is the accumulated effect of what has happened in the history of governance. Governance here consists mainly of political and economic governance. The political governance is characterized by the types of presidents, and number of dissenting voices in the national assemblies. Whereas the economic governance can be reduced into how much human capital has been produced and how much real growth has been registered. We can use the literacy rate to measure the human capital, and real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate to measure the real growth. If the growth rate has not changed with increased literacy, then there is mal-governance in the economic production of human capital. That is, the quantity of human capital is either inadequate or inefficient and unfit to effect changes in the real growth rate. Because economic growth has other determinants other than human capital and those determinants can as well effect changes in the poverty variable albeit through the economic growth. For example, labor, investment and trade can all affect poverty variable in a country but only if they are transformed into final economic output, such as GDP. They do not directly go into changes in the poverty, unless they effect changes in the economic final output. Thus, real economic growth rate is an instrumental variable that can explain changes in the poverty variable.
Whereas, human capital measured as the literacy rate, is a direct economic governance input for explaining changes in the poverty. An educated person is an informed person that can analyze and make informed judgments including his or her status of being relatively or absolutely poor. Whatever judgment he or she has arrived at about his or her status the person will end up striving for better based on the information and education he or she has. Thus, an educated person, per se, is a force against poverty. The literacy rate, like the poverty index, is a sum index of what has happened in the history of economic production of human capital. Therefore, the literacy index today can be associated with the poverty index today.
The real economic growth rate, unlike the literacy rate, is often a measure of economic production rate of a particular period, for example, one year or one quarter of the year; it is not a sum index of what has happened in the history of economic production many years back. To make it at the same scale measure with poverty index, we take the log real per capita GDP of the year 2007. Year 2007 is the point of observation for our cross sectional data. The other economic governance variable that affects poverty is the government expenditure which could be a cause of poverty as a result of structural failure on the part of the government to provide some minimum social safety nets for everybody. If the government expenditure fails to devote resources to poverty reduction programs, poverty will rise, and hardly go away since it is caused by structural failures rather than personal failures.
Thus, good governance should have in its governance expenditure significant poverty reduction program. Poverty is also assumed in this paper to decline as new and fresh ideas are introduced in the governance process by having new presidents and by allowing dissenting voices in stable political governance. Thus, to gauge information about the political governance, we need to measure the types of presidents, the number of dissenting voices and the stability of the political institutions. It will be difficult to measure exactly and quantify these political variables, but with reasonable assumptions we can. To measure a variable of type of presidents, we introduce a variable called presidential longevity. This variable measures the average length of stay in power a president has in the period of self governance by the country until 2009. The longer the stay, the more diminished the ideas will be, fresh ideas will be often challenged.
Therefore, we expect fresh ideas and new types of presidents to be introduced when the shorter the presidents stay in power. Each time a new president comes in, it is expected to be a different type of president from his or her predecessor, and that he or she will put in some effort to differentiate himself or herself with new programs that will impact on the lives of people more differently than that of the predecessor. With these assumptions, we introduce the variable presidential longevity to measure the type of presidents in the country. The provisions for civic protests and the percentage of dissenting voices in the national assemblies and stability are political governance variables that can have profound impact on poverty. These variables measure how far people can express themselves and protest about their situations so that the politicians can take actions to address the situations. However, due to data limitation, we are not able to collect data on the dissenting voices in the national assemblies and the number of civic protests in the period of the study, instead we assume the number of coups and attempted coups to be a proxy measure for the civic protests, dissenting voices in the national assemblies and the stability of the country. This is because the high number of coups and attempted coups in the country quickly breeds emergency condition that suffocates civic protest and opposing voices in the country; and high number of coups and attempted coups is associated with high instability of the national institutions. These five governance variables, presidential longevity, instability, literacy rate, real economic growth rate and real government expenditure form the explanatory variables for the poverty situation in a country. Thus, our model can be formulated as, The adjustment made is to re-classify the oil exporting countries into the aforementioned three groupings. Nigeria and Cameroon are reclassified into low-income countries, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Republic of Congo into middle-income countries, and Chad into fragile countries. Niger is re-classified from low-income group into fragile group, due to its recent political impasses and famine. Two dummies will be introduced in the model to account for the middle-income and low-income groups whereas; the fragile group will be treated as the benchmark model. D1 = 1, if the country belongs to the middle-income group and D1 = 0, otherwise. D2 = 1, if the country belongs to the low-income group and D2 = 0, otherwise.
The subscript i stand for the individual countries in the study, and they are the Sub-Saharan African countries. The data on poverty and literacy rates are extracted from Human Development Report 2009 of United Nations Development Programme. The data on real government expenditure as a percentage of real GDP and real GDP per capita are extracted from the IMF Regional Outlook 2009 for Sub-Saharan Africa. The data on political stability come from McGowan (2003) , who provides an excellent detailed set of data on coups, attempted coups and plots in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1956 . From 2002 , the instability data are calculated by the author.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Governance measured as political instability and presidential longevity is not found to explain significant reductions in the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day or $2.00 a day. In other words, the measures of governance used in this paper have failed to account for poverty reductions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The real government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is also an insignificant contributor to poverty reductions. The paper finds the real per capita GDP growth rate as the only relevant and significant contributor to the poverty reduction. This confirms the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2004) that real income is what matters most to the poverty reduction. But the differences in poverty levels cannot to be attributed to different income levels across the countries, as the dummies for the middle income and low income countries are found insignificant. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the two models are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Our data on 38 Sub-Saharan African countries show that the average percentages of people living on less than $1.25 a day (P1) and on less than $2.00 a day (P2) are 50 and 70, respectively (Table 3 ). The estimates show that on average if the real per capita GDP increases I% the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day and on less than $2.00 a day will fall by 0.4 and 0.25%, respectively. This means with real per capita growth rate of 5%, the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day can be halved in 12.5 years, and the number of people living on less than $2.00 a day can be halved in 28 years, on average. Whereas, a real per capita growth rate of 7% can halve P1 in 9 years and P2 in 20 years. Thus, real per capita growth is considered here the best mechanism for fighting poverty. The political instability measure and the literacy rates are not significant poverty reduction factors. This could be related to the fact that in our data, countries with lower instability do not appear to have less poverty than those with higher instability. For example, Ghana has the highest incidence of political instability of 22 coups and attempted coups, but the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day is 30, the same as in Cameroon with only 2 incidences of political instability, and Botswana with zero political instability. Similar argument can presented for the case of literacy variable. Countries with high literacy rates do not appear to have lower poverty rates than those with low literacy rates. For example, countries like Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Nigeria and Lesotho have literacy rates above 70%, but the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day is more than 40, an incidence which is similarly found in countries, such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and Sierra Leone with lower literacy rates.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The political governance variables are irrelevant to the poverty reductions in the Sub-Saharan Africa, the government expenditure and the literacy rates cannot also explain significant reductions in poverty. The only variable which remains to impact significantly on reducing poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa is the real per capita GDP. A 1% increase in real per capita GDP reduces the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day by 0.40 per cent and of those living on $2.00 a day by 0.25%. Thus, if sub-Saharan Africa maintains a real per capita growth rate of 5%, it can halve the number of poor people living on less than $1.25 a day in 12.5 years, and halve the number of people living on less than $2.00 a day in 28 years. That is, extreme poverty can be alleviated significantly and in a very short period, provided that the real per capita GDP growths constantly at least by 5%, whereas poverty in general will continue to live long. This implies economies that are experiencing slow growth, or growth of 5% and lower, should focus on eradicating extreme poverty; it can be achieved in a shorter time than the poverty in general. While economies where real per capita GDP grows, 7% and above can eradicate extreme poverty in 18 years or less. Governments should not be complacent with high literacy rates, as they are not magic cure for the poverty, if the real per capita GDP cannot be increased in line with increased literacy, then literacy will be of no value to poverty reductions. However, the findings of this paper call for further inquiry into the relationship between political governance and poverty; the factors used in this paper appear irrelevant, other factors could be looked into. The government expenditure and the literacy rates are irrelevant as well under current investigation. The factors could be re-measured and more data collected to provide further evidence on governance-poverty nexus.
